Abstract. In this paper, we study short exponent Diffie-Hellman problems, where significantly many lower bits are zeros in the exponent. We first prove that the decisional version of this problem is as hard as two well known hard problems, the standard decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) and the short exponent discrete logarithm problem. It implies that we can improve the efficiency of ElGamal scheme and Cramer-Shoup scheme under the two widely accepted assumptions. We next derive a similar result for the computational version of this problem.
Introduction
The discrete logarithm (DL) problem and the Diffie-Hellman (DH) problems are basis of many applications in modern cryptography.
Previous works on DL problem
Blum and Micali [1] presented the first cryptographically secure pseudo-random bit generators (PRBG) under the DL assumption over Z primes p, where n is the bit length of p. Gennaro [4] further improved this result in such a way that each full modular exponentiation can be replaced with a short modular exponentiation.
Our contribution on DH problems
Let G q be a finite Abelian group of prime order q. Let g be a generator, that is, G q = g . Then the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is to compute g ab from (g, g a , g b ). The decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is to distinguish between (g, g a , g b , g ab ) and (g, g a , g b , g c ), where a, b and c are uniformly and randomly chosen from Z q . In this paper, we study short exponent variants of the DDH problem and the CDH problem over G q , where significantly many lower bits are zeros in the exponent. More precisely, the short exponent DDH problem has two subproblems, a (Short, Full)-DDH problem in which a is small, and a (Short, Short)-DDH problem in which both a and b are small. The short exponent CDH problem has two sub-problems, similarly.
We first prove that each of the short exponent DDH problems is as hard as two well known hard problems, the standard DDH problem and the DLSE problem. That is, we show our equivalence:
To prove these equivalence, we show that short exponents {g s | s is small} and full exponents {g x | x ∈ Z q } are indistinguishable under the DLSE assumption over prime-order groups G q . A similar result was proved for Z * p by Gennaro [4] based on [8] , where p is a safe prime. Our proof shows that the indistinguishability can be proved much simpler over G q than over Z * p . (Remember that prime-order groups are highly recommended for the DLSE assumption by van Oorschot and Wiener [12] . It is also consistent with the DDH problem which is defined over prime-order groups.)
Our result implies that we can improve the efficiency of ElGamal encryption scheme and Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme directly under the two widely accepted assumptions, the DDH assumption and the DLSE assumption. Indeed, we present such variants of ElGamal scheme and Cramer-Shoup scheme. They are much faster than the original encryption algorithms because short exponents are used instead of full exponents. (Remember that under the DDH assumption, ElGamal encryption scheme [3] is secure in the sense of indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) and Cramer-Shoup scheme [2] is secure in the sense of indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA).)
We next show a similar result for the CDH problem. That is, we prove the equivalence such that
This result implies that we can improve the efficiency of the oblivious transfer protocols of [7, 5] under the CDH assumption plus the DLSE assumption.
We believe that there will be many other applications of our results.
Preliminaries

Notation
|x| denotes the bit length of x. x ∈ R X means that x is randomly chosen from a set X. We sometimes assume the uniform distribution over X. Throughout the paper, an "efficient algorithm" means a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. Let n denote the bit length of q, where q is the prime order of G q . Let c = ω(log n). It means that 2 c grows faster than any polynomial in n. Let lsb k (z) be the function that returns the least significant k bits of z and msb k (z) the function that returns the most significant k bits of z. If we write b = msb k (z), we sometimes mean that the binary representation of b is msb k (z).
Discrete Logarithm with Short Exponent (DLSE) Assumption
Let f (g, z) = (g, g z ), where g is a generator of G q . The discrete logarithm (DL) problem is to compute the inverse of f . The DL assumption says that the DL problem is hard.
We next define the discrete logarithm with short exponent (DLSE) problem as follows. Let f se (g, u||0 n−c ) = (g, g u||0 n−c ), where |u| = c and || denotes concatenation. That is, the exponent of g u||0 n−c is short. Then the DLSE problem is to compute the inverse of f se . The DLSE assumption says that the DLSE problem is hard. Formally, Assumption 1. (DLSE assumption) There exists no efficient algorithm which solves the DLSE problem with non-negligible probability.
Short EXP ≈ Full EXP
In this section, we prove that full exponents and short exponents are indistinguishable under the DLSE assumption. More formally, define A 0 and A n−c as
Theorem 1. A 0 and A n−c are indistinguishable under the DLSE assumption.
A proof is given in Appendix A. We show a sketch of the proof here. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n − c, let
Suppose that there exists a distinguisher D which can distinguish A n−c from A 0 . Then by using a hybrid argument, there exists j such that A j and A j+1 are distinguishable.
We will show that (i) the j can be found in polynomial time and (ii) the DLSE problem can be solved by using the (D, j). We briefly sketch below how to solve the DLSE problem by using the (D, j). (Remember that the DLSE problem is to find x from (g, g x ) in A n−c .)
The difference between A j and A j+1 appears in the (j +1)-th least significant bit b j+1 of exponents x. That is,
Hence we can show that (D, j) can be used as a prediction algorithm of b j+1 . 2. We can compute g x/2 from g x because the order of G q is a prime q. This enables us to use (D, j) to predict all higher bits of x as well as b j+1 (except several most significant bits γ). 3. Suppose that (g, y) ∈ A n−c is given, where y = g v||0 n−c . In order to find the b 1 = lsb 1 (v), we carefully randomize y so that the exponent is uniformly distributed over R j . For this randomization, we need to search some most significant bits γ of v exhaustively, but in polynomial time. 4. After all, by taking the majority vote, we can find b 1 = lsb 1 (v) with overwhelming probability. Next let
where v = v ||b 1 . Applying the same process, we can find lsb 1 (v ) similarly. By repeating this algorithm, we can finally find v with overwhelming probability.
(Short, Full)-DDH = Standard DDH + DLSE
The standard DDH assumption claims that
We now define the (Short, Full)-DDH assumption as follows. Let
where c = ω(log n) with n = |q|. The (Short, Full)-DDH assumption claims that B n−c and C n−c are still indistinguishable. Note that x is short and y is of full length.
We then prove the (Short, Full)-DDH assumption is equivalent to the standard DDH assumption and the DLSE assumption. We first show that the standard DDH assumption and the DLSE assumption implies the (Short, Full)-DDH assumption.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the DDH assumption and the DLSE assumption are true. Then the (Short, Full)-DDH assumption is true.
Proof. From Theorem 1, A 0 and A n−c are indistinguishable under the DLSE assumption, where
First it is clear that C 0 and C n−c are indistinguishable because y and z are random independently of x.
Next we prove that B 0 and B n−c are indistinguishable. Suppose that there exists a distinguisher D which distinguishes B n−c from B 0 . Then we show that there exists a distinguisher D which distinguishes A n−c from A 0 . On input (g, g x ), D chooses y ∈ Z q at random and computes g y and ( We next show that the (Short, Full)-DDH assumption implies the standard DDH assumption and the DLSE assumption. Proof. First suppose that there exists an efficient algorithm M which can solve the DLSE problem with some non-negligible probability . Then we show that there exists a distinguisher D between B n−c and C n−c .
Then it is easy to see that D distinguishes between B n−c and C n−c .
Finally D 1 outputs the output bit of D 0 . Then it is clear that D 1 distinguishes between B n−c and C n−c .
From Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The (Short, Full)-DDH assumption is equivalent to both the DDH assumption and the DLSE assumption.
Extension to (Short, Short)-DDH
We define the (Short, Short)-DDH assumption as follows. Let
y , g xy ) | x ∈ R n−c , y ∈ R n−c } and
Then the (Short, Short)-DDH assumption claims that B n−c and C n−c are indistinguishable. Note that both x and y are short in B n−c and C n−c . We first show that the (Short, Full)-DDH assumption implies the (Short, Short)-DDH assumption. Proof. First suppose that the (Short, Full)-DDH assumption is true. From Theorem 3, both the DLSE assumption and the DDH assumption are true. From Theorem 1, A 0 and A n−c are indistinguishable. Then it is clear that C n−c and C n−c are indistinguishable because x and z are random independently of y.
Next we prove that B n−c and B n−c are indistinguishable. Suppose that there exists a distinguisher D which distinguishes B n−c and B n−c . Then we show that there exists a distinguisher D which distinguishes A n−c from A 0 . On input (g, g y ), D chooses x ∈ R n−c at random and computes g x and (g y )
D finally outputs the output bit of D. Then it is clear that D can distinguish A n−c from A 0 . However, this contradicts that A 0 and A n−c are indistinguishable. Hence B n−c and B n−c are indistinguishable.
Consequently we obtain that
where ≈ means indistinguishable. Therefore, B n−c and C n−c are indistinguishable.
We next show that the (Short, Short)-DDH assumption implies the (Short, Full)-DDH assumption.
Theorem 5. Suppose that the (Short, Short)-DDH assumption is true. Then the (Short, Full)-DDH assumption is true.
Proof. First suppose that the (Short, Full)-DDH assumption is false. Then, from Theorem 2, either the DDH assumption or the DLSE assumption is false.
Further suppose that the DLSE assumption is false. That is, there exists an efficient algorithm M which can solve the DLSE problem with some non-negligible probability . Then we show that there exists a distinguisher D between B n−c and C n−c .
On
Then it is easy to see that D distinguishes between B n−c and C n−c . Next suppose that the DDH assumption is false. That is, there exists a distinguisher D 0 which breaks the DDH assumption. Then we show that there exists a distinguisher D 1 which breaks the (Short, Short)-DDH assumption.
Let (g, g x , g y , g a ) be an input to D 1 , where a = xy mod q or random. D 1 chooses r 1 , r 2 = 0 at random and gives (g, (g
Corollary 2. The (Short, Short)-DDH assumption is equivalent to the (Short, Full)-DDH assumption.
From Corollary 1, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3. The (Short, Short)-DDH assumption is equivalent to both the DDH assumption and the DLSE assumption.
Short Computational DH
Remember that the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is to compute g xy from g, g x , g y , where x, y ∈ Z q . The CDH assumption says that the CDH problem is hard.
In this section, we introduce two variants of the CDH assumption, (Short, Full)-CDH assumption and (Short, Short)-CDH assumption. We then prove that each of them is equivalent to the standard CDH assumption and the DLSE assumption.
Short variants of the CDH assumption are defined as follows.
Assumption 2. ((Short, Full)-CDH assumption)
There exists no efficient algorithm for computing g xy with non-negligible probability from g, g x , g y , where x ∈ R n−c and y ∈ Z q . Assumption 3. ((Short, Short)-CDH assumption) There exists no efficient algorithm for computing g xy with non-negligible probability from g, g x , g y , where x ∈ R n−c and y ∈ R n−c .
We first show that the standard CDH assumption and the DLSE assumption imply the (Short, Full)-CDH assumption.
Theorem 6. Suppose that the CDH assumption and the DLSE assumption are true. Then the (Short, Full)-CDH assumption is true.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an efficient algorithm A which computes g xy from g, g
x , g y such that x ∈ R n−c and y ∈ Z q . If the CDH problem is easy, then our claim holds. Suppose that the CDH problem is hard. We then show an efficient algorithm B which distinguishes between A 0 and A n−c . On input (g, g x ), B chooses y ∈ Z q randomly and computes g y . B gives (g, g x , g y ) to A. Suppose that A outputs z. B checks if z = (g x ) y . Now from our assumption, if (g, g x ) ∈ A n−c , then z = g xy with non-negligible probability. If (g, g x ) ∈ A 0 , then z = g xy with negligible probability. This means that B can distinguish between A 0 and A n−c . From Theorem 1, this means that the DLSE assumption is false.
We can prove the converse of Theorem 6 similarly to Theorem 3. Therefore, we obtain the following corollary. We next show that the (Short, Short)-CDH assumption is equivalent to the standard CDH assumption and the DLSE assumption. The proof is based on the same argument for the (Short, Full)-CDH assumption and the random self-reducibility of the discrete logarithm problem. The details will be given in the final paper.
Applications
In this section, we present fast variants of ElGamal encryption scheme and Cramer-Soup encryption scheme. Each variant uses a short random exponent r such that r is essentially c bits long, where c = ω(log |q|) and q is the order of the underlying group.
Note that computing g r requires at most 2c modulo multiplications in our variants while it requires at most 2n modulo multiplications in the original algorithms. Hence our variants are much faster than the original encryption algorithms.
We can prove their security easily from our results. They are semantically secure under the DDH assumption and the DLSE assumption (i.e., our variant of ElGamal scheme is IND-CPA and our variant of Cramer-Shoup scheme is IND-CCA, respectively). They are one-way under the CDH assumption and the DLSE assumption.
Security of Public Key Cryptosystem
A public key encryption scheme is called one-way if it is hard to compute the message m from a public key pk and a ciphertext C.
The security in the sense of indistinguishability is defined as follows. Consider the following model of adversaries. In the find stage, the adversary chooses two messages m 0 , m 1 on input pk. She then sends these to an encryption oracle. The encryption oracle chooses a random bit b, and encrypts m b . In the guess stage, the ciphertext C b is given to the adversary. The adversary outputs a bit b . We say that the public key cryptosystem is secure in the sense of indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) if | Pr(b = b) − 1/2| is negligibly small (as a function of the security parameter).
The security against chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) is defined similarly except for that the adversary gets the decryption oracle and is allowed to query any ciphertext C, where it must be C = C b in the guess stage.
(Short, Full) ElGamal Encryption Scheme
ElGamal encryption scheme is (1) one-way under the CDH assumption and (2) IND-CPA under the DDH assumption. Now our variant of ElGamal encryption scheme is described as follows.
(Key generation) Choose a generator G q and x ∈ Z q randomly. Letĝ = g 2 n−c ,ŷ = g x . The public key is (ĝ,ŷ) and the secret key is x.
(Encryption) Given a message m ∈ G, first choose r such that 2 n−c r ∈ R n−c randomly. Next compute c 1 =ĝ r (= g Note that the encryption is very efficient because small r is used. The security is proved as follows.
Theorem 8. The above scheme is still one-way under the CDH assumption and the DLSE assumption.
Theorem 9. The above scheme is still IND-CPA under the DDH assumption and the DLSE assumption.
(Short, Full) Cramer-Shoup Encryption Scheme
We next show our variant of Cramer-Shoup scheme.
(Key generation) Choose two generator g 1 and g 2 at random. Also Choose x 1 x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z ∈ Z q randomly. The public key is (ĝ 1 ,ĝ 2 ,ĉ,d,ĥ, H) and the secret key is (x 1 x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z), where H is a randomly chosen universal one-way hash function.
(Encryption) Given a message m ∈ G, first choose r such that 2 n−c r ∈ R n−c randomly. Next compute The ciphertext is (u 1 , u 2 , e, v).
(Decryption) Given a ciphertext (u 1 , u 2 , e, v), first compute α = H(u 1 , u 2 , e) and test if u The encryption algorithm is very efficient because small r is used. CramerShoup scheme is IND-CCA under the DDH assumption [2] . The proposed scheme is secure under the following assumption.
Theorem 10. The above scheme is still IND-CCA under the DDH assumption and the DLSE assumption.
The proof is almost the same as the proof of [2] . We use Corollary 1. The details will be given in the final paper.
